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This paper describes tests of several hypotheses put forward in the literature on the sig-
nificance of education as a determinant of economic development. It is shown that the
generally positive impact of education on economic development is severely impaired by
‘educational imbalance’ in the case of tertiary education, whereas economic inequality
and repression of political rights primarily seem to reduce the social returns of the lower
educational levels. 1
Overview
The paper is organised as follows: The introduction reviews some of the main theoretical argu-
ments from various disciplines of the social sciences about the relation between education and eco-
nomic development and summarises the main empirical regularities established so far.
Section II presents the empirical results of this study. While the underlying econometric model
follows the standard ‘new’ growth literature procedure of regression analysis in a cross-section of
countries, it goes beyond the existing studies in drawing on a data set including proxies for technical
progress and educational attainment as well as devoting special attention to different levels of edu-
cation, ‘educational imbalance’, socio-economic inequality, political freedom, and possible struc-
tural changes.
Education as a whole is shown to be growth promoting for all levels of economic development.
However, characteristic structural breaks are identified for different levels of educational attainment
and economic development.
Most important, the impact of tertiary education on economic development in less developed
countries is shown to depend on a country’s educational policy: tertiary education does promote
growth, if – and only if – there are no serious ‘educational imbalances’. Consequently, countries
which invest heavily in higher education while neglecting more basic educational levels may gain
little or no social returns. Other – more basic – dimensions of socio-economic and political depriva-
tion (as measured by the Gini-coefficient or Gastil’s political freedom index) do not seem to have
the same negative influence on the social benefits from higher education. Inequality and political re-
pression, however, significantly reduce the marginal contributions of the lower educational levels to
economic growth and development.
The variables, the data and their sources are documented in the appendix (III).
                                                
1  The present analysis is an extension and elaboration of  research  first published in German (Graff, 1996). Drawing
on new data (the latest revised version of the Penn World Tables) to compile the basic economic variables, the
‘higher education’ results from Graff (1996) are strongly confirmed. Moreover, the operationalisation of ‘educa-
tional imbalance’ has been improved by constructing an index variable with clearly defined bounds rather than a
ratio of two variables, as in the earlier paper. The inclusion of measures for socio-economic and political freedom
and the resulting empirical inferences are entirely new work. The author is indebted to Frank Leibbrand for critical
remarks and helpful comments on an earlier version.3
I  Introduction
Traditional economic growth theory seeks to identify equilibrium growth paths. Its approach is
explicitly ahistoric, and the well-known result is that in the long run the secular growth rate of per
capita income depends on exogenous technical change only. Specifically, it is impossible to alter the
secular growth rate by variations of the saving rate (Solow, 1956). This result has led to a general
disappointment with neo-classical growth models; if technical change falls like ‘manna from
heaven’, and no other variables have any perpetual influence on the per capita growth rate, nothing
can be done to improve a country’s growth performance. This, of course, apart from being simplis-
tic, is in no way an acceptable result. Growth rates do differ across time and space, and there are
good reasons to believe that much of the difference is due to economic and social forces that cannot
be considered as given by nature.
During the last decade, economists have taken up the task of endogenising some of the most
obvious driving forces of economic growth into the general setting of the neo-classical system
(Clerc, 1995). Leaving formal details aside, new (or endogenous) growth models generate endoge-
nous growth by introducing some factor of production that does not underlie the ‘law of diminishing
returns’, and making the rate of change of this factor depend on the flow of resources devoted to its
creation. There remains, however, an uncomfortable gap between theoretical necessity and empiri-
cal evidence; in other words, economists need to have a sensible idea of what the new factor of pro-
duction might look like.
Since it is generally accepted that in the long run (and the very long run is what neo-classical
growth models are concerned with) all accumulation of physical capital must eventually run into
diminishing returns, the ‘new’ factor of production has to belong to some sort of ‘intangible’,
knowledge-related capital, and it is here that education enters the stage. Hence, starting with the
seminal article of Lucas (1988), education has been one of the two main candidates to generate en-
dogenous growth (the other being technical knowledge). Without ignoring the formal sophistication
needed to demonstrate that neo-classical growth models which neither necessarily implode or ex-
plode can indeed be formulated, the economic intuition is quite simple and can be stated thus:
Economies with a better educated labour force can make better use of the material factors of pro-
duction as well as of the relevant technical knowledge. If ‘education’ as a factor of production can
be accumulated without running into diminishing returns and physical capital cannot, the resulting
policy advice is to shift resources from capital goods production to education.
The traditional tool for economists to deal with education has been human capital theory.
Hence, some new growth theorists labelled their growth-generating factor of production ‘human
capital’ (though this is a matter of taste rather than a conclusive theoretical implication – labels like
‘R&D’, ‘blueprints’, etc. are also widely used).
The basic idea – i.e. considering education as an investment in future skills (i.e. ‘human capi-
tal’), rather than merely a consumption good – can be traced back to the classics. In the 1950s it was
stated in a formal manner by Becker, Schultz, Mincer and others (cf. Bowman, 1966) and initiated a
huge wave of empirical research. Psacharopoulos (1993), who has been a close observer of this line
of research for decades, summarises its main results as follows:
1. Private as well as social rates of return to education are highest for primary education. The
probable explication is that though at the primary level expenditure per pupil is lowest, the cog-
nitive and motivational effects of instruction are highest, provided school attendance is con-
tinuous.4
2. Rates of return to schooling are higher in poorer than in richer countries. The usual explication
is that the ‘law of diminishing returns’ applies to education. (Note that this somehow contra-
dicts the new growth theorist’s identification of education with the factor which may generate
growth forever.)
3. Private rates of return are higher than their social counterparts, and this more so for higher lev-
els of education. The reason lies in the fact that accounting for public expenses for education
adds more to the costs than taxes and other additional forms of revenue add to national income.
Note that the spread between private and social rates of return to tertiary education is especially
large in LDCs.
4. Rates of return to general education are higher than to vocational and other highly specialised
education. This ‘vocational school fallacy’ (Foster, 1966) has disappointed the high hopes of
development planners in the 1950s and 60s. It is now obvious that vocational schools are eco-
nomically inefficient; generally, the cost of ‘vocationalisation’ by far exceed any measurable
social benefits. (Note that in many instances, there are simply no jobs which require the specific
skills taught in vocational schools.)
Critics of rate-of-return-to-education-computations argue, however, that the results may be far
from accurate; and the published numbers should indeed not be considered more than approxima-
tions to the true values. Certainly, too many confounding variables are causing biases which are
hard – if not impossible – to quantify and the published numbers should indeed not be considered to
be more than crude approximations to the true values (cf. among others Behrman/Wolfe, 1976;
Klees, 1991).
A more serious attack on human capital theory states that its theoretical foundations are un-
sound. According to these critics, the underlying assumption that education raises productivity is
just taken as given; if it is discussed at all, the proof is claimed to be in the domain of sciences oth-
ers than economics, but usually economists refer to ‘intuition’.
Hence, for lack of deeper insights, economists usually model human capital accumulation as a
linear function of time devoted to education, a specification which may be misleading, since there
could be various effects of education at different ages, different levels of education and other
‘structural breaks’ (Helberger, 1988).
Thus, the crucial questions are how education changes individuals and what effects it has on the
aggregate level.
An answer from social psychology is that education promotes individual ‘modernity’, the chain
of causation is stated as education o individual modernity o income. Empirical evidence is given
by Inkeles/Smith (1974), who demonstrate that ‘years of schooling’ is the best predictor for individ-
ual modernity on their ‘OM’(Overall Modernity)-personality scale, provided schooling has been
regular and continuous for at least some three to four years (cf. also Coulclough, 1982). Their con-
clusion is that the school is the major modernising institution and that the education-modernity link
depends most of all on the socialising function of regular school attendance at primary educational
levels.
Despite their instrumental definition of modernity (cf. Mumatz, 1988), Inkeles/Smith have
added to our knowledge that the education-modernity link depends most of all on the socialising
function of regular school attendance at primary educational levels.
Sociologists state that education promotes the rationality of social organisation in various ways.
First, the shift from traditional to meritocratic principles should increase macroeconomic efficiency5
(Behrendt, 1965). Second, the loosening of traditional and religious norms, which is frequently as-
sociated with education, may initiate a ‘social mobilisation’ of innovative activity (Deutsch, 1961),
and scholars of economic history claim that this is exactly why modernisation and industrialisation
occurred two centuries ago in today’s DCs (Rosenberg/Birdzell 1986: 34). In contrast, Weber’s fa-
mous hypothesis is that the strict ‘ethics of Protestantism’ – asceticism and thrift – are a driving
force in capitalist development (Weber, 1905); thus attributing high importance to the prevalence of
religious norms instead of their relaxation. More recent contributions, however, cast doubt on the
significance of religious norms for economic behaviour (Wuthnow 1994: 622). Moreover, valuable
as they may be for the interpretation of economic history, sociological macro-theories are very hard
to handle in a quantitative fashion.
While the contributions discussed so far try to fill the explanatory gap left open by human
capital theory, others deny that it is a useful concept at all. First of all, the signalling/screening-
hypotheses refer to the selective function of educational systems and claim that differences of indi-
vidual income may have little or nothing to do with productivity differentials caused by education.
Instead, economic positions (and incomes) are allocated to according to the applicant’s formal level
of education (Bhagwati/Srinivasan, 1977; Spence, 1973). According to this view, formal education
promotes ‘credentialism’ and does not add anything to macroeconomic efficiency (though it per-
fectly explains private rates of return to education).
While pure educational credentialism is unlikely to be very common, it might prevail in certain
labour markets, especially where diplomas of distinguished grammar schools, colleges or universi-
ties serve as entry tickets into the local elite. The more the signalling function of diplomas reveals
some characteristics relevant to economic productivity, however, the more it is likely to increase
macroeconomic efficiency. It is thus reasonable to assign some relevance to human capital theory
and the signalling/screening-hypotheses as well; though for different explanatory ranges (Rubin-
son/Browne, 1994: 594). While human capital theory and modernisation hypotheses rely on in-
creased productivity by socialisation or acquisition of skills which are provided by the primary and
perhaps the secondary levels of the educational system, educational credentialism might be the rule
for the tertiary level.
In this context, a lively controversy is concerned with the educational policy of LDCs. While it
is generally acknowledged that the LDCs have managed to increase educational levels at an aston-
ishing rate (Patel, 1986), critics argue that too many poor countries spend too much on tertiary edu-
cation (e.g. Blaug, 1979; Justman/Teubal, 1991). In this view, ‘educational imbalance’, i.e. fostering
higher education while neglecting more basic educational levels, often create nothing but highly
specialised ‘academic proletarians’ without hope of ever being able to use their skills; or – even
worse – strong incentives for the highly skilled to migrate abroad: the so-called ‘brain drain’
(Blomqvist, 1986).
In addition, this controversy has to do with economic and political power. Specifically, accord-
ing to Mokyr (1990), economic history shows that an educated elite which is generally keeping
away from economic, technical, and other practical matters, has been a major obstacle to techno-
logical progress and economic growth (e.g. the classical Greek and Roman civilisations, China after
1500 BC, and the Latin American offshoots of Iberian origin). And when nowadays some of the
poorest countries afford a sophisticated system of higher education which has little or nothing to do
with the real problems of backward countries (Pritchett, 1995), while illiteracy and poverty continue
to be the fate of the majority of the population, it may indeed not be a far-fetched assumption that
these educational systems serve mainly to perpetuate social and economic inequality and thereby the
privileges of the ruling elite: educational credentialism at its worst.6
In less extreme cases, however, the potential dynamics of economic developments may suggest
other conclusions. The rise to economic and political power of a well-educated, highly motivated
and innovative new elite plays a decisive role in various theories of economic development (Bar-
tel/Lichtenberg, 1987; Easterlin, 1991; Eisenstadt, 1973; Machlup, 1970; Schultz, 1988), and it is
considered a precondition for the Rostowian ‘take off into sustained growth’ (Rostow, 1960).
Moreover, education figures prominently among other possible determinants of a country’s capacity
to absorb technology from abroad (Dowrick/Gemmell, 1991) like R&D (Cohen/Levinthal, 1986),
and in this context it is plausible to assume that the higher levels of education are more important
than more basic ones.
To summarise, the present theoretical knowledge about the role of education in economic de-
velopment is highly fragmented and inconclusive. To gain more understanding of the ‘true’ relation-
ships and to rule out ‘false’ hypotheses it is therefore advisable to turn to empirical research.
For empirical investigations, the standard procedure in the ‘new growth’ literature is to refer to
an ‘augmented’ aggregate production function









where Y is GDP, A a constant, K physical capital, L labour, H human capital, and T a proxy for the
state of technical knowledge. Assuming constant returns to scale in K, L and H (D + E + J = 1),2 i.e.
the production inputs traded on factor markets, dividing by L, and taking logarithms and time de-
rivatives yields
g(Y/L) = gA + D g(K/L) + J g(H/L) + M gT ,
where gX stands for the continuous growth rate of a variable X. As much of the recent discussion is
concerned with ‘convergence’, in addition to the right-hand variables derived above, there usually is
a ‘convergence’ variable like the log of per capita income at the beginning of the time period stud-
ied (Y/L), and a vector Z of proxy-variables for possible determinants of a country’s capacity to ab-
sorb technology from abroad as well as a number of socio-political and institutional variables
(Barro, 1991). 3 The typical estimation equation is thus
g(Y/L) = a0 + a1 g(K/L) + a2 g(H/L) + a3 gT + a4 ln (Y/L) + 6 ai Zi .
From the studies conducted so far, several general conclusions emerge (Levine/Zervos, 1993;
Sala-I-Martin, 1994). First, physical capital accumulation is by far the most important determinant
of economic growth. Second, controlling for physical capital accumulation and educational vari-
ables, countries with initially lower per capita incomes are indeed catching-up (conditional conver-
gence). Third – and of most importance for the present paper —, controlling for physical capital ac-
cumulation and initial per capita income, countries with higher scores for educational variables tend
to grow faster.
However, there are serious difficulties to come to a coherent interpretation of the various – and
in many instances contradictory – regression coefficients of the wide range of educational variables
                                                
2  Cf. Graff (1995) for a series of empirical tests in a comparable research design, showing that the null hypothesis of
constant returns to scale to K, L and H  may be maintined at all conventional significance levels.
3  Adding level-variables as regressors for the growth rate of per-worker income rates somewhat alienates the estima-
tion equation from the production function framework, the parameters, therefore, must not be interpreted as exact
production elasticities. In addition, while the growth rates are stationary, the level-variables Y/L and H/L are not,
which may cause further biases (Pritchett 1995). As in most of the ‘new growth’ empirics, attention, therefore, will
be given primarily to the estimated signs rather than to minor differences in parameter magnitudes.7
used by different researchers; and especially the empirical evidence on the benefits of tertiary edu-
cation is far from clear: Some studies suggest that poor countries may expect high returns to in-
vestments in the tertiary level of education, while others indicate no social benefits, or even adverse
effects.
To a certain degree, this may probably be explained by the use of indicators that are notoriously
unreliable (e.g. enrolment rates and literacy rates). Worse, perhaps, is that frequently researchers
choose indicators of dubious validity (e.g. enrolment rates for educational stocks, educational at-
tainment of urban workers in largely rural societies, or years of schooling in the labour force ex-
cluding all persons under twenty five, i.e. ist possibly most dynamic part). Moreover, the ‘model’ of
educational effects – if it may thus be called – is generally linear, assuming homogenous human
capital. Consequently, possibilities of structural breaks, critical values, diminishing or increasing
returns to education, and contingencies of certain types of education on other variables cannot be
dealt with.
Exceptions from this simplistic model are Bowman/Anderson (1976), who show that literacy
rates must exceed some forty per cent before they show any correlation with economic growth. Oth-
ers have demonstrated that the same applies to ‘years of schooling’ which likewise show no corre-
lation – simple or partial – unless they exceed three to four years (Azhar, 1988; Graff, 1995;
Lau/Jamison/Shu-Cheng/Rivkin, 1993). Some studies test for structural breaks (Benavot, 1989;
Timmermann/Graff, 1995; Wolff/Gittleman, 1993). These studies consistently confirm that primary
education contributes more to economic growth in LDCs than in DCs, thereby giving some evi-
dence for the modernisation-hypothesis. The results for tertiary education, however, are again con-
tradictory: While Benavot (1989) finds a significantly negative influence of tertiary enrolment on
the growth rate of per capita income, Wolff/Gittleman (1993) get a significantly positive regression
coefficient, although only for the DCs. Timmermann/Graff (1995) compute a principal component
variable for higher educational levels which yields a positive coefficient for all income levels, and in
Graff (1995) ‘years of schooling’ of persons with tertiary education is significantly positive only in
the LDCs.
Hence, there is not only a theoretical, but also an empirical ‘higher education puzzle’, and
much research remains to be done. The following analysis tries to give some tentative answers.
II.  Education and economic growth: a new empirical analysis
The empirical analysis to be presented follows the usual ‘new growth literature’ cross-country
regression method outlined above.4
The sample consists of all seventy-four countries (comprising LDCs as well as DCs), for which
the required variables were available, and covers the period from 1960–92.
The left-hand variable is the 1960–92 growth rate of per capita income in ‘international $’
(g(Y/L)). While the focus is on human capital resulting from education H/L, the set of variables
which has in other studies consistently be shown to contribute to economic growth: the growth of
capital intensity g(Y/L), the ‘convergence’ variable ln  (Y/L), and – now widely accepted (cf.
                                                
4  In the last time, this procedure has been criticised as naively empiricist (cf. Harberger 1998: 21, among others).
Specifically, the ever-present endogenity bias prohibits to interpret the estimated parameters as anything close to
‘growth elasticities’ from which researchers may draw reliable conclusions for future growth behaviour. Accord-
ingly, the following estimations should not be taken to be more than heuristic explorations into some ‘stylised
facts’ of modern economic growth and development.8
Otani/Villanueva, 1990) – a proxy for openness to trade Z, is taken into account. In addition, we
compute a rarely used variable, a proxy for technical progress gT. H/L, g(Y/L), ln (Y/L), Z and gT
are then simultaneously included on the right-hand side as control variables, thereby reducing the
ever-present omitted variable bias. Consequently, the basic estimation equation is
g(Y/L) = a0 + a1 ln (H/L) + a2 g(K/L) + a3 gT + a4 ln (Y/L) + a5 Z .
If not stated otherwise, the primary data are from the ‘Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6.’ (Sum-
mers/Heston, 1988, revised version, University of Toronto, December 1997). The sampling proce-
dure, the operationalisation and computation of the variables are described in the appendix. Two
remarks, however, are in order:
First, economists have recently become aware of the serious problems underlying international
statistics on educational data supplied by organisations as UNESCO, UNDP and the World Bank
(Behrman/Rosenzweig, 1994). While these data are readily available for use in cross-country/time-
series analysis, little attention has usually been given to the scarcity of the underlying observations
(most of the printed data are actually no more than extra- or interpolations, or even worse: mere
‘guesstimates’). Moreover, the informational content of widely used data such as adult literacy rates
or the mean years of schooling of the population over twenty five is doubtful for the econometrics
of economic growth, since it may be a poor proxy for educational attainment of the economically
active population. In addition, the latest available data-bases on educational attainment (Barro/Lee,
1996; Nehru/Swanson/Dubey, 1995) unfortunately suffer from the fact that schooling is grouped by
the traditional levels (primary, secondary and tertiary, which vary considerably across countries),
rather than by grades, thereby ignoring some important information on the structure of the educa-
tional stock. The present paper tries to avoid some of the usual problems by using all available in-
formation on educational attainment from population census publications. Census data on educa-
tional attainment have several advantages: They are neither biased by the prestige of literacy, nor
are they representing flows, as are enrolment rates. To capture most of the economically important
education-related skills, contrary to the praxis of using data for the population over twenty five, this
study refers to the labour force. Available census data and secondary sources allow the computation
or estimation of the mean years of schooling in the labour force for the seventy-four countries of
our sample in 1975 (MYS), and a further desegregation into three subgroups of educational attain-
ment corresponding to the first six grades, the seventh to eleventh grades, and the higher levels of
education (LOW, MED, and HIG).5
Second, the inclusion of ‘technical progress’ – more than all other variables used in the present
study virtually ‘unmeasurable’ – is motivated by the special interest in ‘higher education’ which is
likely to be correlated and/or to interact with ‘technical progress’ (Grossman/Helpman, 1994: 29).
Since no single variable from published statistics is likely to give an unbiased estimate of technical
progress, the procedure followed here is to consider a wide array of information from international
statistics on R&D, patenting activity, scientific publications, and direct acquisition of technical
knowledge from abroad, and then to take the first principle component of these variables as a proxy
for gT.
                                                
5  It would have been desirable to include growth rates for the schooling variables (i.e. proxies for g(H/L)) as well;
due to the scarcity of census data, however, this would restrict the sample to less than thirty countries which is in-
sufficient for statistical inference. Thus, g(H/L) was dropped as a right-hand variable.9
Results
The first step of the present analysis is to conduct four OLS-regressions of g(Y/L) on the set of its
potential determinants considered in this study according to the basic equation derived above, where
H/L is represented by MYS, LOW, MED and HIG respectively. The results are given in table 1.




Intercept 4.79*** 4.19*** 4.51*** 5.67***
 . 10–2 (3.39) (2.72) (3.14) (3.60)
ln MYS 7.23***
 . 10–3 (2.97)
ln LOW 1.23
 . 10–3 (.71)
ln MED 3.26**
 . 10–3 (2.34)
ln HIG 3.80***
 . 10–3 (2.50)
g(K/L) .52*** .53*** .55*** .50***
(13.51) (12.42) (14.18) (12.20)
gT 3.87*** 5.26*** 4.13*** 3.74*
 . 10–3 (2.38) (3.02) (2.50) (2.30)
ln (Y/L) –7.01*** –4.88** –5.59*** –6.49***
 . 10–3 (–3.57) (–2.46) (–2.99) (–3.29)
Z (Openness) 8.08** 8.91*** 7.50*** 9.61***
 . 10–4 (3.24) (3.38) (2.89) (3.77)
------------------------------------------------------------------
R
2 .84 .83 .84 .84
------------------------------------------------------------------
t-statitics in brackets, n = 74, one-tailed significance: *** p d.01, ** p d .05 * p d.1.
As shown in table 1, the estimated coefficients – with the notable exception of LOW – are sig-
nificantly different from zero with their expected signs. Compared to other estimations in the ‘new
growth’ literature, the model fares very well (all R
2s exceed .8) and confirms the importance of
physical capital accumulation and openness for economic growth as well as strengthening the evi-
dence for ‘conditional convergence’, though according to the present estimates convergence is pro-
ceeding very – and for the LDCs: painfully – slow.6
                                                
6  Following Mankiw/Romer/Weil (1992), the ‘convergence rates’ that can be computed from the coefficients for
ln (Y/L) are .0063, .0045, .0055, and .0065. Taken at face value, these convergence rates imply that for a typical
country, it would take 111, 153, 135 or 118 years (depending on the specification of the educational human capital10
The coefficients for educational human capital reveal the following pattern: MYS, MED and
HIG contribute significantly to economic growth, whereas the coefficient of LOW is not signifi-
cantly different from zero. The human capital accumulated during the years of schooling of mem-
bers of the labour force with no more than 6 years of schooling, so might be followed, does not add
to labour productivity.
Before accepting such far-reaching conclusions, however, the next step should be to control for
possible structural breaks. To this end, the sample is split in two subsamples by educational attain-
ment: thirty-seven countries with less and thirty-seven countries with more than the median value of
MYS. Then a regression with the general human capital variable MYS for H/L is run across the two
subsamples to test for the stability all regression coefficients, including the intercept, but excluding
H/L. The usual F-Test with five and sixty-three degrees of freedom results in an empirical F-statistic
of 1.10, whereas the critical value (p d .1) is 1.94, so for the five freed parameters taken together –
and holding H/L constant – there is not even a moderately significant structural break between the
two subgroups with different educational attainment. The same test is then conducted with LOW,
MED and HIG for H/L, likewise giving insignificant F-statistics (.63, .50 and .65, respectively)
Therefore, in the regressions that follow, the slopes for the control variables and the intercept are
always computed for the whole sample, while the coefficients of the different variables for H/L are
allowed to vary across the subgroups. Table 2 gives the resulting human capital coefficients for the
two subgroups and the corresponding F-statistics for significance of structural breaks.
TABLE 2:  Regressions for subgroups by educational attainment (MYS)
------------------------------------------------------------------
low MYS high MYS F-Test for
(n = 37) (n = 37) structural break
------------------------------------------------------------------
ln MYS 7.91*** 7.14*** .25
 . 10–3
ln LOW 0.32 1.72 .26
 . 10–3
ln MED 3.77** 2.32 .38
 . 10–3
ln HIG 6.75*** 9.42 5.72**
 . 10–3
------------------------------------------------------------------
One-tailed significance for coefficients,
two-tailed significance for structural breaks (df = 1, 67),
*** p d .01, ** p d .05, * p d .1.
Table 2 shows that though the estimated coefficients for MYS, MED and LOW vary across the
two subgroups, the differences are far from significant.
                                                                                                                                                                 
variable), i.e. some five to eight generations, to only halve the difference between its actual and ‘secular’ growth
rates. Therefore, convergence, be it ‘unconditional’ or ‘conditional’, is of course nothing for the LDCs to count
upon for a fast remedy against their present poverty and misery.11
Moreover, as in table 1 for all seventy-four countries taken together, the coefficients for LOW
are in no case significantly correlated with growth – not even, as might be expected, in the educa-
tionally more backward subgroup of countries. A possible interpretation could refer to the ‘law of
diminishing returns’. There might already be so much of human capital at lower levels – even in
LDCs – that the marginal contribution escapes conventional significance levels.
Another possible explanation relies on similar facts, but is purely statistical: If educational at-
tainment is about to surpass the level measured by LOW in all countries, i.e. also in LDCs, there is
little or no variance across countries. Consequently, all countries might benefit greatly from mem-
bers of the labour force with primary education (compared to none), but exactly the fact that all (or
most) countries have surpassed this level of educational attainment implies that it cannot make any
difference in a cross-country comparison. Be this as it may, there are good reasons not to underrate
the importance of primary education, and not too much weight should be given to its statistical in-
significance in the present context.
Finally, HIG deserves special attention. As table 2 shows, the coefficient for HIG is signifi-
cantly higher for the subgroup of countries with less educational attainment; moreover, it is signifi-
cantly positive only in this group of countries; for the more educated countries alone, it is not even
significant at very moderate levels (p d .1). This finding is again compatible with human capital
theory. Specifically, since higher education yields higher coefficients in the group that comprises the
countries with lower educational attainment, a plain explanation is that the more advanced countries
have begun to run into ‘diminishing returns’.
Therefore, inferring from the present sample and model, the thesis that poor countries spend too
much on tertiary education seems to be misguiding. From our results, one might rather conclude that
the richer, rather than the poorer countries, have reason to doubt the macroeconomic usefulness of
their educational policy.
These conclusions, however, would stand in striking contrast not only to the results of other
empirical analyses that imply little, none, or even negative effects of higher education on economic
growth of LDCs, but also with what is known of its sometimes extremely dubious integration into
practical economic uses in LDCs due to rent seeking and other – at least from a macroeconomic
perspective undesirable – activities.
We therefore suggest two explanations to reconcile these contradictions: first, a statistical, and
second, a theoretical with third some tentative empirical checks.
First, a statistical explanation lies in the educational variables used in this study as compared to
those mostly used in previous studies: Whereas others often rely on enrolment rates, i.e. flows, or
readily available educational stock variables, like educational attainment of population over twenty
five, this study has undertaken the task to measure, as exactly as possible, the educational stock rep-
resented in a country’s labour force. While the choice of variables may be negligible in DCs, it
probably makes a decisive difference for the measurement of education as a factor of production in
many LDCs with rapid population growth, a very young labour force and an only recent expansion
of educational efforts. Under such conditions, considerable time may elapse between initial educa-
tional efforts (flows) and major changes of the composition of educational stocks in the labour
force. Moreover, these changes will first of all affect the younger cohorts. Consequently, studies re-
lying on educational flows may systematically understate the effects of education which – after all –
are not likely to come soon; while others may miss the educational qualifications of a significant
part of the labour force. So the different statistical estimates for the effects of ‘education’ may be
due to the use of educational variables which sometimes are simply not valid, and at other times not12
sufficiently reliable to capture what is to be approximated: the educational stocks in the labour
force.
Alternatively, a theoretical explanation takes a closer look at the arguments put forward by the
critics of higher education in LDCs: It is never doubted that higher education may be useful to eco-
nomic development; what they actually claim is that in many LDCs it does not serve any of its eco-
nomically useful functions; instead it has rather the characteristics of a ‘consumption good’ for the
upper classes – which need not necessarily be regarded as ‘waste’, but for which, of course, there is
no social necessity for subsidy either. Worse, education might indeed generate skills which, how-
ever, in some societal settings are mainly devoted to unproductive or even harmful activities like
rent seeking or crime (Pritchett, 1995). At the same time educational credentialism may prevail,
turning higher education into a pure screening device, serving to legitimate socio-economic ine-
quality and deprevation of political participation (Rubinson/Browne, 1994: 594).
Higher education proper would then be neither an impediment nor an inducement to economic
development. ‘Educational imbalance’, however, might indicate that scarce resources are used in the
interest of the members of the elite instead of being channelled into uses with high social rates of
return.7 In this view, ‘educational imbalance’ not only implies macroeconomic ‘opportunity costs’,
but indicates the existence of an influential elite and of high inequality and, thereby, a high potential
for social conflict which in turn, may indeed be harmful to economic growth.
For a test of this hypothesis, a country’s ‘educational imbalance’ (EI) is approximated by an in-
dex that captures the relation of resources channelled into tertiary education as compared to primary
education in 1975.8 Specifically, the seventy-four countries are split into two new subsamples by EI,
thirty-seven ‘low scorers’ and thirty-seven ‘high scorers’.
In addition, two other, and possibly related, variables are considered: Gastil’s ‘political rights
and civil liberties’ index, which is likely to capture deprivation of political participation, and the
Gini coefficient (for which data are available for sixty nine counties of our sample of seventy-four)
as a proxy for economic inequality.
Accordingly, there are three variables by which to split our sample into thirty-seven education-
ally more vs. thirty-seven less balanced, thirty-seven politically more vs. thirty-seven less repressive
and thirty-five more vs. thirty-four less egalitarian countries. Then – as before – the basic regression
is repeated with an additional degree of freedom for H/L, for which the coefficient is allowed to
vary between the subgroups. The results are given in table 3. (Note that, according to the imbal-
ance/distortion-hypothesis outlined above, significance tests for structural breaks are one-tailed.)
                                                
7  Pritchett (1995) gives some evidence for the suspicion that the public sector in LDCs acts as an ‘employer of last
resort’ for the well-educated labour force which may indeed result in serious misallocations of scarce resources.
8  For details see appendix.13
TABLE 3:  Regressions for Subgroups by educational imbalance, inequality, and political participa-
tion
------------------------------------------------------------------
low educational high educational F-Test for
imbalance IE imbalance IE structural
(n = 37) (n = 37) break
------------------------------------------------------------------
ln MYS 7.41*** 6.94*** .10
 . 10–3
ln LOW 1.50 .99 .04
 . 10–3
ln MED 3.69*** 1.45 .82
 . 10–3
ln HIG 5.19*** 0.01 3.70**
 . 10–3
------------------------------------------------------------------
low repression high repression F-Test for
(n = 37) (n = 37) structural break
------------------------------------------------------------------
ln MYS 8.92*** 6.72*** 2.30*
 . 10–3 
ln LOW 2.96** –2.07 3.44**
 . 10–3 
ln MED 3.61* 3.14** 0.04
 . 10–3
ln HIG 3.37** 4.19** .17
 . 10–3
------------------------------------------------------------------
low inequality high inequality F-Test for
(n = 35) (n = 34) structural break
------------------------------------------------------------------
ln MYS 6.86*** 4.84** 2.57*
 . 10–3
ln LOW 0.18 0.96 0.09
 . 10–3
ln MED 3.43** 1.09 1.34
 . 10–3
ln HIG 2.91** 3.50** .12
 . 10–3
------------------------------------------------------------------
One-tailed significance for coefficients;
one-tailed and structural breaks (df = 1, 67),
*** p d .01, ** p d .05, * p d.1.14
Table 3 shows no significant differences for MYS, LOW and MED between countries that score
low or high on EI. HIG, however, has a significantly higher coefficient in the low-EI subsample.
Moreover, as predicted by the ‘educational imbalance’ version of the signalling/screening-
hypotheses, higher education yields a coefficient close to zero in the high-EI subsample.
The results are, however, different for the sample split by the civil liberties/political repression
variable. The F-statistics show that there is no difference between the coefficients for the higher
educational levels, whereas there are significant structural breaks for MYS and LOW. Hence, a lack
of political rights seems to exert the expected negative influence on educational efficiency on the
basic educational levels rather than on higher education. According to these results, in countries
with low repression, especially the lower levels of education seem to be more growth promoting
than under more repressive regimes.
The results for the sample split by the Gini coefficient are fairly similar to the civil liber-
ties/political repression subsampling procedure. Here, a significant structural break is detected for
MYS, indicating that education taken as a whole yields generally higher social returns in more
egalitarian countries, though this regularity is weak and far from significant for the three sub-levels
of educational human capital.
These first and admittedly still tentative tests give some support to the educational imbal-
ance/distortion-hypotheses: According to the present sample and model, a less repressive and more
egalitarian system generally seems to provide a better environment for a positive contribution of
education to economic growth and development. Moreover, the contribution of higher education to
economic growth is indeed negligible in countries that are characterised by strong ‘educational im-
balance’, whereas in countries with a more balanced educational policy, it is clearly positive.
Discussion
The results of the present study, in addition to confirming much of what has been repeatedly
shown in the ‘new growth’ empirics (i.e. ‘conditional convergence’), offer some new insights into
the role of education at different levels of development which – if robust – could be a useful contri-
bution to the debate about the wisdom of giving high priority to tertiary education in LDCs. Thus,
some critics of tertiary education in LDCs, although having good reasons for their complaints about
‘educational wastage’ and ‘diploma disease’ in poor countries, miss the decisive point which – ac-
cording to our results – lies in the fact that it is not poverty or backwardness which makes tertiary
education a waste of scarce resources; quite on the contrary: it is shown that the marginal contribu-
tion of tertiary education to productivity growth declines with the accumulation of educational
stocks.
A slight reformulation of the critics’ argument, however, is bringing it in line with the facts:
tertiary education is indeed not a growth inducing factor – or even harmful to growth – in countries
which are characterised by strong ‘educational imbalance’. However, in countries which follow a
‘balanced’ educational policy with a base of widespread primary education, secondary and – per-
haps most of all – tertiary education may be a decisive growth factor.
Moreover, socio-economic inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) and deprivation of
political participation (as measured by Gastil’s political rights and civil liberties index) do not seem
to exert the same detrimental influence on the social benefits of higher education as educational im-
balance proper, though educational efforts generally – and, possibly: especially efforts aimed at the15
elementary level – seem to be more promising as a growth promoting device in less repressive and
more egalitarian countries.
III.  Appendix: country-sample, variables, data and sources
The country sample consists of seventy-four countries (excluding countries with a population of
less than one million and oil-export based economies), for which the required educational, techno-
logical and economic variables were available (cf. table below). The analysed period ranges from
1960–92.
The per capita growth rate g(Y/L) from 1962–92 is taken as ß1 from ln (Y/L)t = ß0 + ß1 t, using
OLS. Data are RGDPCH from the Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6) and t is measured in discrete
years. (The predicted value for ln (Y/L)1960, is our ‘convergence variable’.)
Physical capital: The average growth rate of physical capital accumulation 1960-92 g(K/L) is com-
puted with estimates of aggregate capital stocks that have been obtained by the perpetual in-
ventory method as specified for LDCs by Harberger (1978) and refined by Nehru/Dhareshwar
(1993), using a depreciation rate of ten per cent. All underlying data are from the Penn World
Tables (Mark 5.6), and growth rates are computed in the same way as for g(Y/L).
Educational human capital (H/L) is from census data and from secondary sources (as documented
in Psacharopoulos/Arriagada, 1992), where MYS is mean years of schooling in the labour force
around 1975, and LOW, MED, and HIG result from a desegregation of MYS into three sub-
groups of educational attainment corresponding to adults that have completed the first six
grades, the seventh to eleventh grades, and the higher levels of education. The present study
draws on Psacharopoulos’ and Arriagada’s (1992) data as well as their method, which has been
used to extend their original educational database relying on various editions of the UN Demo-
graphic Yearbook.
Technical progress: Since no single variable from published statistics is likely to give an unbiased
estimate of gT, the procedure followed here is to use as much information from international
statistics on R&D (expenditure and professionals engaged), patenting activity (domestic and
international), scientific publications (‘scientometric’ data), and direct acquisition of technical
knowledge from abroad (royalties and expenditure for foreign licences) as possible. A principal
component analysis of six indicators of the above mentioned type yields a first component that
already explains eighty five per cent of all the variables’ variance. In the present study the ‘fac-
tor scores’ of this principle component serve as a proxy for ‘technical progress’ gT. (For further
details see Graff (1995)).
A country’s openness to trade Z is proxied by the residual û from the regression
((M+X)/Y) = ß1 + ß2 ln Y + û, where Y is GDP, M is imports and X is exports, and all data are
taken as 5-year averages from 1973–77 (for 1975). This procedure is motivated by the well-
known dependence of the volume of international trade on the size of a country’s home market.
(The estimated parameter for ß2 equals –.83 with a highly significant t of –3.40, i.e. the vari-
ables are indeed behaving as expected ) Data are from the Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6).
Educational imbalance (EI) is proxied by 1 – ((PRIM – TER) / PRIM), where PRIM and TER are
primary and tertiary enrolment rates for 1975, and data are from UNESCO Statistical Yearbook.
Since – mainly due to many ‘repeaters’ – reported primary enrolment rates exceed 1.0 for thirty-
three countries in our sample, thereby not unambiguously expressing primary schooling for a
higher share of a cohort, 1.0 is taken as the upper bound.16
Economic inequality (Gini) is measured by the Gini coefficients as given in Deiniger/Squire (1996).
Mean values for 1960–92 have been computed using all data labelled ‘accept’ (highly reliable),
referring to lower quality data only for those countries that would otherwise have to be dropped
from the sample.
Political rights and civil liberties (GI) are measured by Gastil’s well-known and widely used index
(mean values for 1960–89). Data are from King/Levine (1994).
TABLE:  The country-sample and variable values for educational attainment, technical progress
and imbalance proxies, sorted by per capita income 1995
------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      MYS     LOW     MED        HIG        wT         EI          GI        Gini
------------------------------------------------------------------
Malawi 3.13 1.09 2.00 .02 -.93  .009 6.5 52
Niger .83 .72 .13 .06 -1.11  .005 6.0 36
Togo 1.90 .82 .86 .21 -.82  .012 5.9 ...
Rwanda 1.87 1.74 .28 .05 -.87  .005 5.6 29
Central Afr. 2.19 1.01 .82 .07 -.75  .005 6.3 55
India 2.18 1.12 .69 .37 -.89  .106 3.0 31
Kenya 2.99 .59 2.31 .10 -.82  .008 4.6 54
Cameroon 2.11 1.49 .59 .09 -.80  .015 5.4 49
Haiti 1.52 .54 .83 .10 -.62  .011 3.0 ...
Bangladesh 2.37 .72 1.39 .22 -1.31  .036 4.2 35
Pakistan 1.89 .69 .88 .30 -1.07  .046 5.0 32
Indonesia 4.27 2.60 1.30 .36 -1.11  .028 5.3 34
Ghana 3.48 .36 2.87 .16 -.88  .015 5.0 35
Senegal 2.56 1.87 .56 .12 -.49  .050 4.1 54
Zambia 4.90 1.39 3.35 .13 -.46  .022 5.1 47
Nigeria .84 .59 .11 .00 -1.24  .015 3.9 39
Egypt 2.95 1.26 1.06 .61 -.58  .180 4.6 37
Sri Lanka 6.52 1.59 4.62 .21 -.79  .017 3.3 41
Honduras 3.60 2.25 .98 .36 -.39  .053 5.7 55
Botswana 2.70 .74 1.81 .14 -.34  .010 3.1 54
Philippines 6.20 2.15 2.10 1.92 -.69  .184 4.5 48
Paraguay 4.92 2.61 1.76 .52 -.64  .067 5.4 42
Congo 4.48 1.10 2.91 .33 -.53  .027 6.2 ...
Thailand 4.45 2.39 1.59 .45 -1.16  .042 4.0 45
Ivory Coast 2.87 1.28 1.65 .00 -.77  .020 5.2 39
Tunisia 3.52 1.42 1.05 .96 -.38  .043 5.1 43
Dominican Rep. 4.26 1.58 1.76 .54 -.51  .100 2.6 47
El Salvador 4.36 1.43 2.54 .36 -.33  .105 3.7 48
Jordan 5.72 1.68 2.68 1.31 -.33  .162 5.7 39
Algeria 3.16 1.36 1.52 .27 -.83  .034 6.0 39
Guatemala 3.12 1.92 .84 .34 -.49  .068 4.1 56
Korea, Rep. 5.91 2.13 2.82 .92 -.20  .103 5.0 34
Colombia 4.92 2.08 2.14 .68 -.73  .077 2.8 52
Nicaragua 3.33 1.64 1.07 .21 -.35  .101 4.7 ...
Ecuador 5.51 2.89 1.77 .84 -.70  .269 3.3 5217
------------------------------------------------------------------
to be continued
TABLE:  The country-sample and variable values for educational attainment, technical progress and
imbalance proxies, sorted by per capita income 1995 (continued)
------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      MYS     LOW     MED        HIG        wT         EI          GI        Gini
------------------------------------------------------------------
Malaysia 6.11 2.81 2.86 .39 -.58 .034 4.0 50
Turkey 3.37 1.76 .93 .65 -.74  .093 3.9 50
Jamaica 6.13 4.83 1.85 .00 -.34  .070 2.7 42
Panama 5.83 2.08 2.62 1.08 -.19  .173 4.7 52
Peru 5.79 2.20 2.33 1.21 -.63  .146 3.9 49
Chile 6.97 1.02 5.06 .85 -.07  .156 4.7 51
Costa Rica 4.50 2.29 1.10 .60 -.19  .177 1.0 46
Syria 4.31 1.94 1.59 .32 -.66  .126 6.6 ...
Brazil 4.52 1.40 2.43 .65 -.25  .122 3.5 57
Uruguay 7.11 2.61 2.87 1.58 -.00  .160 4.5 42
Portugal 4.19 2.71 .89 .58 -.07  .108 2.5 37
Mexico 4.93 2.26 1.61 1.02 -.16  .105 3.7 54
Greece 6.04 2.73 1.98 1.30 .27  .183 2.0 35
Singapore 4.84 1.97 2.20 .62 -.15  .090 5.0 40
Ireland 5.95 1.97 2.83 1.10 .71  .189 1.2 36
Argentina 7.03 2.27 3.58 1.14 .25  .272 3.7 42
Iran 2.17 .85 .97 .36 -.63  .053 6.9 43
Hong Kong 7.99 2.04 4.88 1.04 -.16  .101 2.0 42
Spain 5.58 3.14 1.32 1.10 .46  .204 3.1 26
Israel 9.43 .52 5.44 3.42 1.98  .254 2.4 33
Venezuela 5.44 2.40 2.30 .75 -.10  .181 2.0 44
Trinidad & Tobago 7.02 1.02 5.62 .37 .04  .051 2.0 46
Japan 8.65 3.32 3.32 1.97 2.15  .248 1.0 35
Italy 7.20 2.11 4.27 .72 1.07  .256 1.6 35
Austria 8.15 1.47 5.78 .81 1.17  .187 1.0 29
Finland 7.63 2.78 3.57 1.24 1.34  .272 2.0 30
U.K. 10.90 .29 5.14 4.24 1.74  .188 1.0 26
Belgium 8.13 2.79 3.74 1.53 1.48  .227 1.0 27
Norway 9.12 .77 6.44 1.82 1.37  .221 1.0 34
Netherlands 9.55 1.19 6.18 2.06 1.91  .258 1.0 29
Germany, West 9.58 1.39 6.36 1.68 1.93  .246 1.6 31
New Zealand 10.62 1.24 6.03 3.25 1.01  .259 1.0 34
France 5.57 2.79 1.76 .98 1.66  .245 1.8 42
Denmark 7.67 2.78 3.49 1.26 1.15  .294 1.0 32
Australia 10.35 .89 5.77 3.57 1.42  .240 1.0 24
Sweden 8.25 1.61 4.56 2.07 1.86  .288 1.0 32
Canada 10.42 1.59 5.21 3.58 1.27  .397 1.0 31
Switzerland 9.54 1.87 5.84 1.79 2.23  .165 1.0 34
USA 11.27 .94 5.90 4.38 2.24  .579 1.0 35
------------------------------------------------------------------18
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